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Unspoken Questions in the Rule 32.1 Debate:
Precedent and Psychology in Judging
David E. Klein*

I. Introduction
The legal community's debate over the seemingly esoteric Proposed
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 might be expected to draw little more
than yawns from people who do not sit on a bench, practice law, or spend much
time in law schools. But, as quickly becomes apparent from the papers in this
symposium and the literature upon which they draw, the debate can be highly
instructive, even fascinating, to nonlawyers who want to understand judges and
the law they produce. Part of the fascination is in seeing how passionate many
members of the legal community are about the issue and how impressively each
side marshals normative arguments for its position. But an equally valuable
aspect of the debate, from a social scientist's perspective, is how well it
highlights gaps in our knowledge about what judges do and how they think.
The purpose of this short essay is to direct attention to several empirical
questions that are raised by but not answered in the debate. Naturally, there are
many such questions. Some of those relating most closely to the proposed
rule-such as how unpublished dispositions are produced and how they are
used and regarded by lawyers and judges-are already receiving systematic
scrutiny.' This Article focuses on questions that transcend the debate over Rule
32.1, implicating fundamental issues of why judges act as they do and how the
law emerges, and that have not been the subject of a broad and sustained
research program in law schools. These issues fall into two main areas:
Associate Professor of Politics, University of Virginia. I am grateful to David Caudill
for his invitation to contribute this essay, and to him, the other participants in the symposium,
and Greg Mitchell for helpful discussions.
1. In addition to the interview and survey evidence discussed by Professor Barnett in this
symposium, there is related evidence in the Federal Judicial Center's recently completed report,
*

TIM REAGAN ET AL., CITATIONS TO UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS IN THE FEDERAL COuRTS OF APPEALS:

PRELIMINARY REPORT (Apr. 14, 2005), available at http://nonpublication.con/gc.pdf. See
generally Stephen L. Wasby, UnpublishedCourt of Appeals Decisions: A HardLook at the
Process, 14 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 67 (2004).
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judges' use of precedent and the workings of the judicial mind. In discussing
what we do and do not know about these issues and some potentially fruitful
areas of inquiry, I will draw on work from political science and psychology. A
secondary but still important aim of this Article is to argue for the value of
greater crossfertilization across disciplinary boundaries.
II. The Use of Precedent
A. How Much and "hy?
Consider a pair of unconnected claims, one from opponents of Rule 32.1
and one from proponents. Some opponents claim that allowing citation of
unpublished opinions would inevitably result in those opinions being given
undue weight by lawyers and lower court judges. In his letter opposing the
rule, Judge Kozinski writes:
[L]ower court judges, whose rulings will be appealed to the circuit, are
extremely reluctant to ignore fine nuances of wording that they believe
reflect the views of three court of appeals judges. Unlike law review
articles, opinions of district courts and other nonbinding authorities,
unpublished dispositions of the circuit are seldom dismissed as
inconsequential, yet they should be.2
According to another opponent, "Every judge and lawyer in America has
internalized the hierarchical nature of our justice system; the word of a federal
Court of Appeals, even unpublished, will not be treated the same as the word of
3
a legal scholar or newspaper columnist.
The concern raised by the Rule's proponents is that disallowing citation
robs lawyers and judges of a valuable set of precedents. In the words of ajudge
writing in support of the Rule:
Judges rely on this material for one reason; it is helpful. For instance,
unpublished orders often address recurring issues of adjective law rarely
covered in published opinions.... We have all encountered the situation in
which there is no precedent in our own circuit, but research reveals that
colleagues in other circuits have written on the issue, albeit in an

U.S.

2. Letter from Judge Kozinski, U.S. Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit, to Judge Alito,
Circuit

Judge

for

the

Third

Circuit,

(Jan.

16,

2004),

available at

http://www.nonpublication.com/kozinskiletter.pdf.
3. Memorandum from Patrick J.Schiltz, Reporter, to Advisory Committee on Appellate

Rules 45 (Mar. 18, 2004) (quoting Letter from E. Vaughn Dunnigan to Peter G. McCabe,
Secretary for Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 1 (Feb. 8, 2004), available at
http://www.secretjustice.org/pdf files/comments/03-AP-322).
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unpublished order. I see no reason why we ought not be allowed to
consider such material.4
What the claims have in common is an assumption that judges take
precedents very seriously even when they are not technically required to.
Perhaps this assumption could have been accepted without demur a few
generations ago. But today we must approach it with at least some skepticism.
It has been many years since legal realists like Frank, Llewellyn, and
Pound first argued that precedents are far less constraining than they are
sometimes made out to be, in that "a court can usually find earlier decisions
5
which can be made to appear to justify almost any conclusion" and will
frequently be tempted to do so. Applying empirical tests to realists' logic,
political scientists have gathered a great deal of evidence suggesting that
judges' individual beliefs about right and wrong and what is good or bad policy
exert a substantial influence on their decisions. There is still a lively debate
over the "attitudinal model",6 in political science, but the debate focuses on how
much room judges' personal attitudes leave for other influences to act; few
would contest the claim that personal attitudes play an important role in their
decisions. Indeed, the belief that judges' attitudes are important is so well and
so long entrenched among political scientists that it would be a challenge to
find a single political science study ofjudges' decisionmaking published in the
last thirty years, whether of supreme, intermediate appellate, or trial courts, that
did not include a variable intended to measure judges' ideology. 7 It would
probably be impossible to get such a piece published today.
Of course, the legal community knows the realist/attitudinalist position
well, and it is commonly cited by legal academics and judges. Some of the
public comments on Rule 32.1, such as this one from an opponent, have a
distinctly realist flavor:
Facts drive cases. It doesn't help to add authorities. It's a waste of time
and paper for a litigator in the Ninth Circuit to add a "persuasive" cite from
4. Schiltz, supranote 3, at 47-48 (quoting Letter from Judge Ripple, U.S. Circuit Judge
for the Seventh Circuit, to Judge Alito, U.S. Circuit Judge for the Third Circuit 1 (Feb. 12,
2004), available at http://www.secretjustice.org/pdf files/comments/03-AP-335.pdf).
5. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 163 (Peter Smith Publ'g 1970) (1930).
6. The term comes from the most prominent proponents of the realist view in
contemporary political science. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD SPAE=H, THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE ATTrruDINAL MODEL REVsITED (2002) (describing the "attitudinal model" as a theory

stating that Supreme Court Justices decide cases by evaluating the facts and by considering their
own ideological values).
7. See generally LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (1997) for a
valuable overview of the literature.

1712

62 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1709 (2005)
the Southern District of Florida or the Middle District of Pennsylvania.
8
The same would be true of nonbinding cites from the circuit itself.

Nevertheless, the debate over Rule 32.1 illustrates what I believe to be a
general truth-that the implications of the realist position are not always taken
as seriously as they might be in thinking about the law and judging.
Let us assume for the moment that a strong version of realism accurately
describes judging: Judges are powerfully swayed by their personal values and
reactions to the facts of a case, and precedents can usually be evaded or
manipulated to permit desired outcomes. In this world, even binding
precedents might have only a weak effect. Precedent with less normative force
should have very little influence. In the most exhaustive study to date of stare
decisis at the United States Supreme Court, Spaeth and Segal found that
Justices who dissented from a decision were rarely willing to adhere to that
decision as a precedent in later cases. 9 Unpublished dispositions are typically
thought to possess little, if any, normative force. It is easy to imagine circuit
judges in the realist world citing unpublished opinions to help justify positions
already reached, but hard to imagine them relying on unpublished opinions to
reach a position that they otherwise would have rejected.
Lower court compliance with superior courts' precedents is less of an
anomaly in the strong legal realist world: Lower court judges may follow
precedent simply to avoid being reversed. However, it is not yet settled how
much judges actually worry about reversal. 10 Even if they are greatly
concerned about reversal, judges are well aware that unpublished opinions are
not considered binding by circuit judges and usually were not even written by
them. Knowing these facts, only a highly risk-averse judge could feel much
constrained by an unpublished circuit court decision. Perhaps many district
judges are that risk-averse, but I do not see any reason to assume so without
proof.
8. Letter from Judge John Noonan, United States Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit, to
Peter G. McCabe, Secretary for Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Dec. 16, 2003),
available at http://www.secretjustice.org/pdf files/Comments/03-AP-052.pdf.
9. See generally HAROLD J. SPAETH & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE OR MINORITY
WILL: ADHERENCE TO PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (1999).
10. For conflicting positions on the importance of reversal, compare Charles M. Cameron,
New Avenuesfor Modeling JudicialPolitics,presented at the 2nd Annual Conference of the W.
Allen Wallis Institute of Political Economy (Oct. 1993) and McNollgast, Politics and the
Courts: A Positive Theory of JudicialDoctrineand the Rule ofLaw, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1631
(1995), with David E. Klein & Robert J. Hume, FearofReversal asAn Explanation ofLower
Court Compliance, 37 LAW & SoC'Y REv. 579 (2003), and Frank Cross, Appellate Court
Adherence to Precedent,2 J. OF EMP. LEGAL STUD. 369 (2005). Unfortunately, these pieces and
others focus largely on circuit court-Supreme Court interactions. There has been even less
systematic attention to the importance of reversal for trial judges.
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Because it is difficult to reconcile the assumption that judges give
substantial weight to nonbinding precedents with a strong realist view of
judging, we should be reluctant to accept it unless we are confident that the
strong realist position is wrong. Like many legal scholars, I believe that that
position is at least partly wrong. But empirical researchers have had a far easier
time identifying attitudinal influences on judges' decisionmaking than more
traditionally "legal" influences. u Much more work must be done before those
who doubt the strong realist position can justifiably disregard it.
Even assuming the realist picture of decisionmaking is indeed incomplete,
what other important influences are at work? This is another difficult empirical
question that emerges from but is not directly confronted in the Rule 32.1
debate. Proponents' emphasis on the importance of access to other judges'
thinking suggests that they believe that judges look to the legal views of other
judges who have confronted similar cases in the past because they care about
getting the law right. Opponents seem to have in mind less laudable influences,
such as unthinking adherence to norms when they are not applicable or the
desire to reach a decision without too much effort. I do not have space to
defend this claim, but at the logical level it seems clear that none of these three
possibilities is either implausible or self-evidently more important than the
others. Nor does the empirical literature offer much help in determining why
and when each of these influences operates on judges or which has the greatest
impact.
Although difficult to address, these questions matter. If we could answer
them confidently, we would have a better chance of agreeing about whether the
adoption of Rule 32.1 would add to or detract from the quality of judges'
decisionmaking. More broadly, we would be in a better position to understand
how and how well judges make law when they have the opportunity or
responsibility to do so-why an approach taken or rule announced in one
opinion is taken up, ignored, or rejected by other judges-and whether the
results for society are beneficial or not. Such an understanding would in turn
help us to evaluate other possible judicial reforms.
B. How?
The debate over Rule 32.1 raises questions not just about how much and
why judges rely on nonbinding precedents, but also about how they use them.
11. For interesting evidence of the influence of precedents and a helpful discussion of
other efforts to find it, see Mark J. Richards & Herbert M. Kritzer, JurisprudentialRegimes in
Supreme Court Decision Making, 96 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 305 (2002).
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There are probably several that are worthy of discussion, but I will focus on
the question of how much influence a single precedential case is allowed to
exert over decisions in subsequent cases. Put another way, do judges tend
to look to a body of precedent for help in deciding a case that necessarily
differs from each prior case, if only in a small way, or do they typically rely
on a general rule announced in a single opinion to resolve any case that
falls into a broadly related set?
A closely related question is whether "words chosen by judges for
their opinion have some controlling future force, just like a statute," or later
judges "give force only to the ideas expressed in a judicial opinion, ideas
that can be expressed using a variety of words and phrases." 12 Under
traditional understandings of legal reasoning, judges are normally expected
to do the latter, piecing together a general rule from a set of similar cases
and disregarding as dicta overly broad statements in any one opinion. If
they depart from this approach and accept a previous court's language as
binding, they grant it more influence than it otherwise might have.
The consequences of adopting Rule 32.1 would depend partly on
which type of practice is more common. As Judge Kozinski points out,
overloaded appellate judges "don't have the time to consider how the
language of [an unpublished] disposition might be construed (or
misconstrued) when applied to future cases." 13 Hence, to the extent that
lawyers and district judges are guided by the language of circuit court
opinions, we must take seriously the argument of Rule 32.1 's opponents
that the Rule could lead to the codification of language that would be better
left in obscurity. On the other hand, insofar as lawyers and judges focus on
the ideas underlying earlier decisions rather than the language expressing
them, Rule 32.1 proponents are right to emphasize that even routine
applications of established rules have potential value for elucidating and
testing the logic of those rules.
Forceful scholarly objections to practices that give great weight to
single precedents, 14 such as deference to language, point to implications
12. Richard B. Cappalli, The Common Law's Case Against Non-PrecedentialOpinions,
76 S. CAL. L. REv. 755, 784 (2003).
13. Kozinski, supra note 2, at 5.
14. See, e.g., Cappalli, supranote 12, at 784 (arguing precedential value should not hang
on word choice); Penelope Pether, InequitableInjunctions: The ScandalofPrivateJudging in
the U.S. Courts, 56 STAN. L. REv. 1435 (2004); Joan M. Shaughnessy, Commentary:
Unpublicationand the JudicialConcept of Audience, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1597, 1603
(2005) ("The concern with resolving every future permutation of any opinion before it has been
completed may have gone too far."). Apparently, the issue is not entirely new. Jerome Frank
reported concerns "that courts have been paying too much attention to the language of prior
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that go well beyond Rule 32.1. Part of what seems to concern critics is the
very fact that these practices appear to be inconsistent with traditional
understandings of what common law judges do. But their objections go
deeper than that. An idea-oriented, case-by-case approach to precedent is
more cautious and, at least from the perspective of the court deciding the
initial precedent, more humble. An idea-oriented approach recognizes that
the first court may be unable to foresee all possible circumstances in which
its intended rule might apply, and it leaves later courts more freedom to
adapt the rule or limit its reach as necessary. On the other hand, there is
something to be said for a system in which the first court can announce a
general rule and expect other courts to respect it-most importantly, that
such a system might provide greater clarity and consistency to litigants,
lawyers, and lower court judges.
So how do judges use precedents? I do not think we know yet.
Scholars' impressions that judges today expect the language in their
published opinions to bear a heavy burden is reinforced by some statements
from judges themselves. 15 But I am not aware of any systematic empirical
evidence demonstrating that these impressions are correct. And even if
they are, that does not mean that judges in subsequent cases treat the earlier
opinions as their authors intended. Nor do logic and assumptions about
judges' motivations yield a confident answer. On the one hand, we might
expect later courts to resist giving too much weight to earlier judges'
statement of a rule, because doing so cedes some of their own power to
shape the law. On the other hand, being able to rely on a single source for
the statement of a rule can make judges' lives easier. In addition, judges
might appreciate the greater predictability offered by this approach to
precedent, and they might feel an obligation not to undermine that
predictability by taking a different approach.

cases and.., should.., pay more attention to what judges in earlier cases have decided as
against what they have said in their opinions." FRANK,supra note 5, at 162-63.
15. In her public comment on the rule, Judge Cynthia Holcomb Hall writes:
To the extent there is any possibility that an "unpublished disposition" might serve
as even persuasive authority in a future case, conscientious judges will refrain from
preparing anything but the most fully vetted opinion out of the concern that
imprecise language might later be manipulated by a clever attorney to support a
proposition that the judges never intended.
Letter from Judge Hall, United States Circuit Judge, to Peter G. McCabe, Secretary for the
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Jan. 12, 2004), at 2, available at
http://www.secretjustice.org/pdf files/Comments/03-AP-133.pdf see also Kozinski, supranote
2, at 2 (noting published opinions "set the law of the circuit").
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III. Psychology and Accountability

In its emphasis up to now on Rule 32.1's implications for the use of
precedents, this paper reflects the larger debate on the Rule. But the Rule's
effects may not be limited to what happens after an unpublished decision is
handed down; it also may affect the reasoning that goes into that decision. The
word "accountability" crops up fairly often in arguments for the Rule, including
in the symposium comments of Professors Cravens and Pether.16 Sometimes
the term is used to refer to citizens' ability to maintain some awareness of, and
control over, the actions of public officials in a democracy. But, it is also
sometimes used in a different context to suggest that a judge may be
encouraged to exert more effort in order to write a better opinion, if the judge
knows the opinion will be associated with him or her and read by others. As
Professor Carpenter puts it, "[W]ritten opinions encourage judges to produce
well-reasoned, well-written decisions because they subject judges' conclusions
to public scrutiny. This leads to better, more consistent opinions
because it
17
holds judges accountable to the public which they serve."'
Pushing this notion just a bit further, we might suppose that when one is
accountable for a decision, not only will the opinion justifying it be written with
greater care, but the very reasoning that goes into the decision before any
attempt is made to justify it in writing might be of higher quality. The general
proposition that people who know that their decisions will be scrutinized will
reason more soundly has received a good deal of systematic attention from
social psychologists. In this section, I will give a brief overview of some
central theories and findings from the psychology literature and raise questions
about how well these apply to judges.
If we were to ask members of the legal community to describe the kind of
reasoning that an ideal judge would employ to decide cases, the details would
differ from one respondent to another. It seems likely, however, that all would
agree on some fundamental desiderata: for instance, that the judge take into
account all and only truly relevant evidence, weigh the evidence appropriately,
be aware of the considerations that are playing a role in his or her decision, and
not allow emotion to rule reason. Unfortunately for a would-be ideal judge,
one of the most consistent findings in social and cognitive psychology from the
past few decades is that human beings often do not succeed in thinking like
16. See also Pether, supra note 14, at 1483 (noting lack of accountability as a cost of
unpublished opinions).
17. Charles E. Carpenter, Jr., The No-CitationRule for Unpublished Opinions: Do the
Ends ofExpediencyfor OverloadedAppellate Courts Justify the Means of Secrecy?, 50 S.C. L.
REv. 235, 248 (1998).
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this. Researchers have amassed mountains of evidence regarding various
cognitive shortcomings. To name just a few, stereotypes come to mind8
unbidden and sometimes affect our thinking whether we want them to or not;'
moods and emotions influence our thinking and behavior;' 9 we often reach
moral judgments almost instantly through intuitions, with logic providing only
post hoc rationalizations; 20 we rely on hindsight to overestimate the
predictability of past events; 2 1 and we exhibit "confirmatory bias" by paying
more attention to evidence that supports our favored hypotheses than evidence
that contradicts them.22 Furthermore, many of these influences on our thinking
and behavior occur automatically and undetected.23
Judges' minds may not work the same way as those of the ordinary people
or college students who are the subjects of most research in social psychology.
Law school and experience in practice and on the bench provide judges with
intensive training in reasoning, and training makes a difference. "Formal
education, particularly in statistics and economics, and even short training
sessions on the use of normative reasoning principles can improve performance
on a number ofjudgment and decisionmaking tasks.',24 Still, judges are human,
and it is hard to imagine that they escape all the cognitive pitfalls that other
people stumble into. Important support for this intuition comes from a study by
Guthrie et al.,25 which shows that judges are prone to several biases in their
reasoning, hindsight bias among them. Similarly, psychologists have found
18. See Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: TheirAutomatic and Controlled
Components, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 5-6 (1989) (considering the "inevitability
of prejudice" perspective on automatic activation of stereotypes) (citing E.R. Smith & N.R.
Branscombe, Stereotype Traits can be Processed Automatically (1985) (unpublished
manuscript, Purdue University)).
19. See Joseph P. Forgas & Jennifer M. George, Affective Influences on Judgments and
Behaviorin Organizations:An InformationProcessingPerspective,86 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 3, 4 (2001) (reviewing recent research demonstrating the influence of
moods on judgment).
20. Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist
Approach to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REv. 814, 814 (2001).
21. Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the JudicialMind,86 CORNELL L. REv. 777, 799 (2001).
22. Angela M. Pfeiffer et al., Decision-Making Bias in Psychotherapy: Effects of
Hypothesis Source and Accountability, 47 J. COUNS. PSYCHOL. 429, 429 (2000) (citing Mark
Snyder et al., SocialPerception andInterpersonalBehavior: On the Self-FulfillingNatureof
Social Stereotypes, J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 656, 657-59 (1977)).
23. See John A. Bargh et al., Automaticity of Social Behavior: Direct Effects of Trait
ConstructandStereotype Activation on Action, 71 J. PERSONALITY. & Soc. PSYCHOL. 230, 230
(1996) (discussing automaticity).
24. Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics' Perfect Rationality Should Not Be
TradedforBehavioralLaw and Economics'EqualIncompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 87 (2002).
25. Guthrie et al., supra note 21, at 799.
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that trained therapists do not avoid all cognitive pitfalls; for instance, they
about their clients more readily
"attend to hypothesis-consistent information
26
information.
than hypothesis-inconsistent
So while it is an open question how susceptible judges are to shortcomings
in reasoning, it seems reasonable to proceed on the assumption that they are not
immune to them. And although they may engage in faulty reasoning less often
than other people, the costs when they do so may be much higher.
Unrecognized stereotypes can infect factfinding, verdicts, and sentencing.
Intuitive moral judgments can inspire decisions that are inconsistent with
precedent or statutory or constitutional language. Confirmatory bias can cause
judges to misweigh the evidence in individual cases or to overestimate the
wisdom or value of a rule they favor by tilting the sample of hypothetical cases
they bring to mind toward those where the rule would work well.
Because judicial reasoning errors can be so consequential, it behooves
those of us who care about judging to ask how the risk of such errors can be
reduced. Here psychology is not quite as helpful: psychologists know far more
about the incidence of reasoning problems than about how they can be avoided
or overcome. But a large body of evidence points to the effectiveness of one
ameliorative technique-accountability. It seems clear that people often make
fewer reasoning mistakes when they know that their decision will have to be
justified to an audience. This holds for a wide range of reasoning problems."
The implications for citability rules are unmistakable. In an era when
most "unpublished" opinions are readily available online, choosing not to
publish in a reporter offers no real assurance that an opinion will not be read
closely by lawyers and by the judges receiving their briefs. Rules banning
citation offer much greater assurance. Because judges are aware of this, such
rules almost certainly reduce their feelings of accountability to a professional
audience. Given the psychological evidence, it is reasonable to suspect that
reduced feelings of accountability lead to more errors in judges' reasoning.
Before awarding the point to proponents of Rule 32.1, it is important to
note that accountability is not a panacea; it has only been found to counter some
types of cognitive errors, and even for those, it does not work in all
circumstances.2 8 Still, if we consider the conditions under which accountability
has the best chance of reducing cognitive errors, they appear to be satisfied by
According to Lemer and Tetlock,
the typical judging experience.
26. Pfeiffer et al., supranote 22, at 430.
27. For a comprehensive overview, see generally Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock,
Accountingfor the Effects ofAccountability, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 255 (1999).
28. Id.at 263; see also Pfeiffer et al., supranote 22 (noting that accountability has little
effect on the confirmatory bias of therapists).
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accountability is most likely to work where "(a) suboptimal performance
result[s] from lack of self-critical attention to the judgment process and
(b) improvement require[s] no special training in formal decision rules, only
greater attention to the information provided. 2 9 The requisite
[s]elf-critical and effortful thinking is most likely to be activated when
decision makers learn prior to forming any opinions that they will be
accountable to an audience (a) whose views are unknown, (b) who is
interested in accuracy, (c) who is interested in processes rather than specific
outcomes, (d) who is reasonably well-informed, and (e) who has a
legitimate 3reason
for inquiring into the reasons behind participants'
0
judgments.
Judges already have special training in decisionmaking, and the characteristics
listed above would seem to describe the primary audiences for judges'
opinions-bench and bar--quite well.
Ultimately, then, it appears that we have good reason to suppose that
judges will be less prone to cognitive errors if they know that their opinions can
be cited. And if accountability really enhances the quality of judicial
decisionmaking, then our interest in it should go well beyond Rule 32.1 to other
procedures and rules that might affect levels of accountability. Does
nonpublication lessen accountability even where unpublished opinions are
citable? Does making decisions in panels rather than alone (as most trial judges
do), meaningfully increase feelings of accountability?
What about
requirements that opinion drafts be circulated to all judges in a circuit? Are
there other policies or institutional arrangements that might enhance
accountability?
Still, we cannot be sure that greater accountability would affect judicial
reasoning. Nor do we have a clear idea of how great the decrease in errors
would be, which specific types of suboptimal thinking would occur less
frequently, or even how much of a problem deficient judicial reasoning is in the
first place. All of these are open empirical questions. And for anyone who
cares about the quality ofjudging, they are quite important.
IV. Conclusion
I have tried in this Article to focus attention on some questions about
judges' reasoning and use of precedent that scholars are a long way from
answering satisfactorily. I do not insist that these questions must be answered
29.
30.

Lerner & Tetlock, supra note 27, at 263.
Id. at 259.
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for someone to reach a position on Rule 32.1, though the position would be
easier to defend if we knew the answers to them. What is more important is
that we can think of many other questions, similar and dissimilar, that would be
easier to address if we had a fuller understanding of how judges actually think
and act. These questions range from narrower technical ones-about
publication, research practices, and the role of clerks and staff attomeys-to the
weightiest questions about why the law moves in certain directions and at what
pace, who benefits from the directions the law takes, how well real judicial
decisionmaking measures up to the profession's and the public's ideals, and to
what degree policy making by judges is legitimate in a democracy.
I do not imagine that the empirical questions highlighted here will be new
to many readers, but because so many issues compete for our attention, it is
helpful at times to remind ourselves of fundamental issues that we still do not
adequately understand. Nor do I mean to imply that all of these questions have
been neglected in empirical work. The cursory discussion in this essay does not
begin to do justice to the vast literature on judicial behavior in political science
or the vibrant and growing literature on the subject in law journals. I feel
confident, however, that few scholars active in the field would contest my basic
premise that we do not know as much about these matters as we would like.
And it seems impossible to deny that the study of what judges actually do (as
opposed to what they should do) occupies only a small fraction ofthe academic
legal community's attention.
To a social scientist studying courts, this last point is both puzzling and
disappointing. It is puzzling because, as the Rule 32.1 debate illustrates, legal
academics care a great deal about the practical implications ofjudges' behavior.
It is disappointing because we would almost certainly make faster progress
toward understanding judging if more legal academics studied the issue and
scholars from various disciplines were more familiar with each other's work. It
is true that social scientists typically have the advantage of more experience
designing and analyzing empirical studies and greater familiarity with theories
of human behavior and institutions from fields outside of law. But legal
academics usually possess a deeper and more nuanced understanding of the
judicial phenomena under study and of the contexts in which they occur, have a
more reliable sense of what theories are likely to work well when applied to
judging, and are able to identify important and intriguing real-world
questions-such as how noncitation rules affect the process ofjudging-that
will often escape scholars focused on broader theoretical debates.
The field of law and economics demonstrates how fruitful collaboration
across disciplinary boundaries can be. If this kind of collaboration could be
extended to the study of what judges do and how they think, the next time a
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procedural change like Rule 32.1 is under discussion, arguments for and against
might be able to rely less on speculation. More importantly, it would help us
better understand the law itself.

